DNSSec - Intro

Wolfgang Jung (post@wolfgang-jung.net)

whoami

  • einer der Micromata Gründer
  • arbeite derzeit bei Polyas
  • Schwerpunkte: Security, Infrastruktur, Linux, Scala

DNS-Intro 1

  • Hierarchisches System
  • „Liefere IP zu symbolischem Namen”
  • UDP-basiert
  • RFC-1034 - Nov.1987
  • Zone file:
    m451.de. 86400  SOA  ns.inwx.de.          # Start Of Authority
                         hostmaster.m451.de.  # Mail-Addresse
                         2018090901           # Serialnumber
                         10800                # refresh
                         3600                 # retry
                         604800               # expire
                         3600                 # TTL
    m451.de. 86400  NS   ns.inwx.de.          # Nameserver
    m451.de. 86400  NS   ns2.inwx.de.         # Nameserver
    m451.de. 3600   IN A 185.11.138.5
    m451.de. 3600   MX   100 mail.ideas-in-logic.de.
                        

DNS-Intro 2

  • Abfrage: www.m451.de (ohne qname-minimisation):
    NS für www.m451.de -> x.root-server.net?: ".de -> NS a.nic.de"
    NS für www.m451.de -> a.nic.de?: "m451.de -> NS ns.inwx.de"
    A für www.m451.de -> ns.inwx.de?: "www.m451.de -> IN A 185.11.138.5"
                    
  • Nachteile: UDP basiert, nicht signiert
  • Antwort kann von jedem geliefert werden
  • Antwort muss nichts mit der Frage zu tun haben (MitM)

DNS-Intro 3

  • Ursprüngliche RRs: SOA, NS, MX, A, PTR, HINFO?
  • Referenzimplementierung BIND
  • später Erweiterungen wie SPF, TXT, RRSIG, CDS, DNSKEY, TLSA... Siehe RRTypes
  • RFCs liefern die Spec auf 2781 Seiten, siehe auch dieser Rant:
    RFC 1034, Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities
    RFC 1035, Domain Names - Implementation and Specification
    RFC 1123, Requirements for Internet Hosts—Application and Support
    RFC 1995, Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS
    RFC 1996, A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone Changes (DNS NOTIFY)
    RFC 2136, Dynamic Updates in the domain name system (DNS UPDATE)
    RFC 2181, Clarifications to the DNS Specification
    RFC 2308, Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS NCACHE)
    RFC 2672, Non-Terminal DNS Name Redirection
    RFC 2845, Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)
    RFC 3225, Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC
    RFC 3226, DNSSEC and IPv6 A6 aware server/resolver message size requirements
    RFC 3596, DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6
    RFC 3597, Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record (RR) Types
    RFC 4343, Domain Name System (DNS) Case Insensitivity Clarification
    RFC 4592, The Role of Wildcards in the Domain Name System
    RFC 4635, HMAC SHA TSIG Algorithm Identifiers
    RFC 5001, DNS Name Server Identifier (NSID) Option
    RFC 5452, Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged Answers
    RFC 5890, Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA):Definitions and Document Framework
    RFC 5891, Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA): Protocol
    RFC 5892, The Unicode Code Points and Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA)
    RFC 5893, Right-to-Left Scripts for Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA)
    RFC 6891, Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)
    RFC 7766, DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation Requirements

    Security
    RFC 4033, DNS Security Introduction and Requirements
    RFC 4034, Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions
    RFC 4035, Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions
    RFC 4509, Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Records
    RFC 4470, Minimally Covering NSEC Records and DNSSEC On-line Signing
    RFC 5011, Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC) Trust Anchors
    RFC 5155, DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence
    RFC 5702, Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC
    RFC 5910, Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
    RFC 5933, Use of GOST Signature Algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC
    RFC 7858, Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS)
    Experimental
    RFC 1183, New DNS RR Definitions

    Best Current Practices
    RFC 2182, Selection and Operation of Secondary DNS Servers (BCP 16)
    RFC 2317, Classless IN-ADDR.ARPA delegation (BCP 20)
    RFC 5625, DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines (BCP 152)
    RFC 6895, Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations (BCP 42)
    RFC 7720, DNS Root Name Service Protocol and Deployment Requirements (BCP 40)

    Informational

    RFC 1178, Choosing a Name for Your Computer (FYI 5)
    RFC 1591, Domain Name System Structure and Delegation
    RFC 1912, Common DNS Operational and Configuration Errors
    RFC 2100, The Naming of Hosts
    RFC 3696, Application Techniques for Checking and Transformation of Names
    RFC 4892, Requirements for a Mechanism Identifying a Name Server Instance
    RFC 5894, Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA):Background, Explanation, and Rationale
    RFC 5895, Mapping Characters for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA) 2008
    RFC 7626, DNS Privacy Considerations
    RFC 7706, Decreasing Access Time to Root Servers by Running One on Loopback

DNSSec - RFC 4033

  • Jeder Nameserver signiert seine Antworten
  • Jeder Nameserver kennt die Public Keys der untergeordneten Zone
  • Neue RRs: DS, DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC, NSEC3, NSEC3PARAM
  • Zwei Schlüssel pro Zone:
    ZSK (volatil, 14d Lebensdauer) &
    KSK (wird dem Parent mitgeteilt)
  • KSK signiert sich selbst und ZSK. ZSK signiert alle Records (RRSIG)
  • Vorteil: ZSK Key-Rollover kann ohne Mitarbeit der übergeordneten Zone erfolgen
  • Vorteil: ZSK kann kurz sein (wichtig für schnelle Antworten)
  • Nachteil: An der Root-Zone hängt alles

DNSSec - Rootzone/Trustanchor des Internets

The DNSSEC Root Signing Ceremony

Hier gibt es das 3h15m(!) Video der Zeremonie.

DNSSec - Abfrage

> delv +vtrace +mtrace A www.m451.de
;; fetch: www.m451.de/A
;; received packet from 192.168.1.4#53
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id:  10286
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUESTION: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1252
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.m451.de.			IN	A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
;www.m451.de.		2796	IN	A	185.11.138.5
;www.m451.de.		2796	IN	RRSIG	A 13 3 3600 (
;						20180922125042 20180908112042 13461 m451.de.
;						FwYUGXWl6ThYkFBWH4z3fSyMO3yv
;						O0HGRhb/tWYmCqxMsLQKVLAqfLX+
;						r1DTmueRHs+WCvmA0UCN15CfySmf
;						Wg== )


;; validating www.m451.de/A: starting
;; validating www.m451.de/A: attempting positive response validation
;; fetch: m451.de/DNSKEY
;; received packet from 192.168.1.4#53
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id:  26443
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUESTION: 1, ANSWER: 3, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1252
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;m451.de.			IN	DNSKEY

;; ANSWER SECTION:
;m451.de.		83644	IN	DNSKEY	257 3 13 (
;						rr05gqdmgNBHZ40bBIMR9VocgwBF
;						CZcgrCR7Gb87Y4YeIHDty8/IYVbr
;						xAytrCuc8VG85Rc9Kjq+hDSjpc6f
;						Qw==
;						) ; KSK; alg = ECDSAP256SHA256 ; key id = 16944
;m451.de.		83644	IN	DNSKEY	256 3 13 (
;						0dNuGSiNHq66qU8s2Rf+Iiv5+/t+
;						aJE3tupLEbHqRZTHT4vIyhStGIrF
;						XOZRiXpt2bZuQOnsFazmyb5hxMVn
;						1A==
;						) ; ZSK; alg = ECDSAP256SHA256 ; key id = 13461
;m451.de.		83644	IN	RRSIG	DNSKEY 13 2 86400 (
;						20180922135042 20180908122042 16944 m451.de.
;						smH5bxe/ifa7xkTAIZrxkUrSKXdF
;						262xL+YS/jtalQhxEQAeYIZ+sJyg
;						0bWLO6Tg56TMz/TSRMEiL+FLOV+y
;						fA== )


;; validating m451.de/DNSKEY: starting
;; validating m451.de/DNSKEY: attempting positive response validation
;; fetch: m451.de/DS
;; received packet from 192.168.1.4#53
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id:  50609
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUESTION: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1252
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;m451.de.			IN	DS

;; ANSWER SECTION:
;m451.de.		83644	IN	DS	16944 13 2 (
;						CFFEF6FB4C83737E5B5F2DE77FA8
;						40149E09BD2721DE0F72EDB0C946
;						9DC20CAE )
;m451.de.		83644	IN	RRSIG	DS 8 2 86400 (
;						20180918200125 20180911200125 33364 de.
;						GDDxfC969C9VMleiJYQ6xi4TBJXo
;						C/m9kZ3qGqXXGoLbq/F6eG0dyjb2
;						oXuzssfTRK/jxfvWpvvU9I1RA9ry
;						lbgz4ZsTp+GpHCRcu4Qm5whYRNjG
;						zauoJ/pNYIDi0ziEgwTAV01Pve6S
;						8SLktYaEsk/XKtXrgeASfo2vF28C
;						RZg= )


;; validating m451.de/DS: starting
;; validating m451.de/DS: attempting positive response validation
;; fetch: de/DNSKEY
;; received packet from 192.168.1.4#53
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id:   3899
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUESTION: 1, ANSWER: 3, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1252
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;de.				IN	DNSKEY

;; ANSWER SECTION:
;de.			4314	IN	DNSKEY	257 3 8 (
;						AwEAAaZEsxM26e8MgLuWsLAeRd7B
;						zNdJjvhfGbqQ1xxtYd4TPPqYr7Qc
;						K9Em18VyYEnjqXOqVWBuOhCWnrij
;						P5GiumIliap+LerHjTk3QCgim1qv
;						w3k7UFOgwMe8yOl7hghG8Nbgw6Un
;						VfmUD71TaGSwj1C5EO2guiXZkFPU
;						p2UzmUmoe5EWwtzCni7L0RDl5MaR
;						VhjUBEkPrAVI603GDTuwtRKZLTiy
;						fc3Qmq/u83/6Knxot5pHp3reRcsp
;						0vk2G+RQubgDKsmaXCql4mPzR911
;						Di68vwbBfSyLZ0EOwVkrO7VJgr/R
;						JJ37JlydfQfGmQ3Dkvw1h8ifZhRC
;						8oOkv8ynUXM=
;						) ; KSK; alg = RSASHA256 ; key id = 39227
;de.			4314	IN	DNSKEY	256 3 8 (
;						AwEAAbg/JmxwVhcxVUCgUIIywYIB
;						rDpEgSeFIL9xwU7XmJgcgsF6/t0c
;						LLnUydK/e/dam2pDyllUqaCZFRf9
;						qagYmgMIoZbvAylIcUqjjv7PjXLs
;						aWC/Ir3ioXFEAUzXfNlsSOeyf3eS
;						wz+DEOafc8+iwuPl5l3V2onV34Q8
;						x3i2CSlj
;						) ; ZSK; alg = RSASHA256 ; key id = 33364
;de.			4314	IN	RRSIG	DNSKEY 8 1 7200 (
;						20180927120000 20180906120000 39227 de.
;						J5ATKKj37fEkKUsJVcsZGgZGa4ec
;						nrTx5MYcq1OgBTuPXY4l83YTq7vy
;						onUlLw+QU0hR4HnbPf4wz875VpgT
;						NZaS8MpzgSfnZFoVrGQiHOLkIHzU
;						7Penf1NhEDip/R6UkvHiS/x747iD
;						WjOc9MwV0XDDzngNftd5iyxfmAnB
;						Pbjah5aX56C0+Wov1WXDXjnbOtop
;						pbACwy3j40/hTcaHnNgRoE7K/c2n
;						hwiHn9skSMxwlB1EsUcHa/Jvflba
;						u5Jcqp0IlYEqwQt/BrtWFiTLOc2K
;						G7/mmSc2Kv5//4odTL6jBIjT0Oi0
;						/cYD1oOiRTJpHgd08OqcOEuVvls+
;						sXFNZA== )


;; validating de/DNSKEY: starting
;; validating de/DNSKEY: attempting positive response validation
;; fetch: de/DS
;; received packet from 192.168.1.4#53
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id:  47427
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUESTION: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1252
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;de.				IN	DS

;; ANSWER SECTION:
;de.			83507	IN	DS	39227 8 2 (
;						AAB73083B9EF70E4A5E94769A418
;						AC12E887FC3C0875EF206C3451DC
;						40B6C4FA )
;de.			83507	IN	RRSIG	DS 8 1 86400 (
;						20180924190000 20180911180000 41656 .
;						QOoEXnZGx6/uVqle8BODQWPhwb+b
;						MT3SNTGRSWNc54JDkwsRilPfF29E
;						zqyL7KDzoKdQ+nF063SHDf+PrOkh
;						wgprZ2XGj+yp2FSiWiu2LfjkiOJ2
;						DLFzO4niUSvQTX/Px3RG/ctYLMuf
;						7PK3KtkN1h8FeN1/j7QrJZiFnqYp
;						/fdgh8CREY5vkzNPdBOcBqdmvO9e
;						se2NXWUlIf1KD+iqE3a5Gh7+OYI0
;						VCXiywB1sFSpIU8CKsDBcxCeRF7k
;						XkRHbLqMWPaQQeod+NARo4xQsi+D
;						3SoShqi3zbkRLSnFbCxH1caLVBqI
;						MOxybsb4quyi3zVDmkmhrnYxWLbn
;						9wLe+w== )


;; validating de/DS: starting
;; validating de/DS: attempting positive response validation
;; fetch: ./DNSKEY
;; received packet from 192.168.1.4#53
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id:   5555
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUESTION: 1, ANSWER: 4, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1252
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;.				IN	DNSKEY

;; ANSWER SECTION:
;.			169897	IN	DNSKEY	257 3 8 (
;						AwEAAaz/tAm8yTn4Mfeh5eyI96WS
;						VexTBAvkMgJzkKTOiW1vkIbzxeF3
;						+/4RgWOq7HrxRixHlFlExOLAJr5e
;						mLvN7SWXgnLh4+B5xQlNVz8Og8kv
;						ArMtNROxVQuCaSnIDdD5LKyWbRd2
;						n9WGe2R8PzgCmr3EgVLrjyBxWezF
;						0jLHwVN8efS3rCj/EWgvIWgb9tar
;						pVUDK/b58Da+sqqls3eNbuv7pr+e
;						oZG+SrDK6nWeL3c6H5Apxz7LjVc1
;						uTIdsIXxuOLYA4/ilBmSVIzuDWfd
;						RUfhHdY6+cn8HFRm+2hM8AnXGXws
;						9555KrUB5qihylGa8subX2Nn6UwN
;						R1AkUTV74bU=
;						) ; KSK; alg = RSASHA256 ; key id = 20326
;.			169897	IN	DNSKEY	257 3 8 (
;						AwEAAagAIKlVZrpC6Ia7gEzahOR+
;						9W29euxhJhVVLOyQbSEW0O8gcCjF
;						FVQUTf6v58fLjwBd0YI0EzrAcQqB
;						GCzh/RStIoO8g0NfnfL2MTJRkxoX
;						bfDaUeVPQuYEhg37NZWAJQ9VnMVD
;						xP/VHL496M/QZxkjf5/Efucp2gaD
;						X6RS6CXpoY68LsvPVjR0ZSwzz1ap
;						AzvN9dlzEheX7ICJBBtuA6G3LQpz
;						W5hOA2hzCTMjJPJ8LbqF6dsV6DoB
;						Qzgul0sGIcGOYl7OyQdXfZ57relS
;						Qageu+ipAdTTJ25AsRTAoub8ONGc
;						LmqrAmRLKBP1dfwhYB4N7knNnulq
;						QxA+Uk1ihz0=
;						) ; KSK; alg = RSASHA256 ; key id = 19036
;.			169897	IN	DNSKEY	256 3 8 (
;						AwEAAfaifSqh+9ItxYRCwuiY0FY2
;						NkaEwd/zmyVvakixDgTOkgG/PUzl
;						EauAiKzlxGwezjqbKFPSwrY3qHmb
;						bsSTY6G8hZtna8k26eCwy59Chh57
;						3cu8qtBkmUIXMYG3fSdlUReP+uhB
;						WBfKI2aGwhRmQYR0zSmg7PGOde34
;						c/rOItK1ebJhjTAJ6TmnON7qMfk/
;						lKvH4qOvYtzstLhr7Pn9ZOVLx/WU
;						KQpU/nEyFyTduRbz1nZqkp6yMuHw
;						WVsABK8lUYXSaUrDAsuMSldhafmR
;						/A15BxNhv9M7mzJj7UH2RVME9JbY
;						inBEzWwW9GpnY+ZmBWgZiRVTaDue
;						mCTJ5ZJWLRs=
;						) ; ZSK; alg = RSASHA256 ; key id = 41656
;.			169897	IN	RRSIG	DNSKEY 8 0 172800 (
;						20180930000000 20180909000000 19036 .
;						GvFso1C76Dk79nt07sVCwGm/Hw3Q
;						ytVpQ0VnxEc2uI3iJnD7Bls2cmyA
;						egT1USX4qY/j+1+j88xhwDVnM21w
;						8fyAppbbea0Ri4gfM4562KNIrUBD
;						JCybijL+4GbTwwq8Z2RKqDjTkEHx
;						vQ7KCV+9ldtzcpzF7FE4ct3rzaEQ
;						T6APVR70dxH+lc/JL1PVdM9zeclh
;						tmRBrfRJHdU9XfqY3PycubLxWtZL
;						NOUqB2gBxwvfK6zg1VCZ8JQCDIfE
;						VyWae1WEooBvHAq4obNJs6rF9JC3
;						qnc5WxIqBZnWD41NkZMbOqvBxJvk
;						Liwvp98qOCkvbKTbneFA0q3ZGtwN
;						OBhajA== )


;; validating ./DNSKEY: starting
;; validating ./DNSKEY: attempting positive response validation
;; validating ./DNSKEY: verify rdataset (keyid=19036): success
;; validating ./DNSKEY: signed by trusted key; marking as secure
;; validating de/DS: in fetch_callback_validator
;; validating de/DS: keyset with trust secure
;; validating de/DS: resuming validate
;; validating de/DS: verify rdataset (keyid=41656): success
;; validating de/DS: marking as secure, noqname proof not needed
;; validating de/DNSKEY: in dsfetched
;; validating de/DNSKEY: dsset with trust secure
;; validating de/DNSKEY: verify rdataset (keyid=39227): success
;; validating de/DNSKEY: marking as secure (DS)
;; validating m451.de/DS: in fetch_callback_validator
;; validating m451.de/DS: keyset with trust secure
;; validating m451.de/DS: resuming validate
;; validating m451.de/DS: verify rdataset (keyid=33364): success
;; validating m451.de/DS: marking as secure, noqname proof not needed
;; validating m451.de/DNSKEY: in dsfetched
;; validating m451.de/DNSKEY: dsset with trust secure
;; validating m451.de/DNSKEY: verify rdataset (keyid=16944): success
;; validating m451.de/DNSKEY: marking as secure (DS)
;; validating www.m451.de/A: in fetch_callback_validator
;; validating www.m451.de/A: keyset with trust secure
;; validating www.m451.de/A: resuming validate
;; validating www.m451.de/A: verify rdataset (keyid=13461): success
;; validating www.m451.de/A: marking as secure, noqname proof not needed
; fully validated
www.m451.de.		2796	IN	A	185.11.138.5
www.m451.de.		2796	IN	RRSIG	A 13 3 3600
                20180922125042 20180908112042 13461 m451.de. Fw...g==
            

DNSSec - Antwort

www.m451.de. 3297 IN A     185.11.138.5
www.m451.de. 3297 IN RRSIG A   # Signatur zum A-Record
                13             # Signaturverfahren -> ECDSAP256SHA256
                3              # Name besteht aus 3 Komponenten
                3600           # TTL der Antwort
                20180922125042 # not valid before
                20180908112042 # not valid after
                13461          # Schlüssel ID
                m451.de.       # Name des Signierers
                FwYUGXWl6ThYk...SmfWg== # base64 signatur
            

DNSSec - Was bringt es denn nun?

  • DNS Betreiber kann signierte Informationen zu seiner Domain liefern.
  • IP-Adressauflösung als Standard
  • Falls signiert, dann auch ok
  • Beim MitM fehlt die Signatur oder löst nicht zum Root-Schlüssel auf
  • MX Records zur Domain
  • Aber auch: welche Namenseinträge gibt es nicht (NSEC3)
  • Bester Anwendungsfall: DANE

DANE - Domain-authenticated named entities

  • DNSSec stellt sicher, dass die Antwort von dem Inhaber des DNS der Domain kommt
  • Publizieren des Fingerprints von Zertifikaten!
  • Via TLSA Record:
    _25._tcp.mail.ideas-in-logic.de. 3600 IN TLSA	3 1 1 AD1...28
    _25._tcp.mail.ideas-in-logic.de. 3600 IN TLSA	2 1 1 60B...18
    
  • Liefert den Fingerprint des Zertifikats des TLS Servers auf Port 25
  • Domain-Validated Zertifikat ohne CA!
  • Funktioniert nur mit DNSSec (ansonsten ist ja ein MitM möglich), Pflicht für EmiG.
  • Lösung für Postfix: https://www.cs-ware.de/blog/archives/175

DNSSec - Ok, aber wie?

  • Durch den DNS-Dienstleister (Private-Key liegt dann aber auch bei dem)
  • Betrieb eigener DNS-Server, oder als hidden-primary
  • BIND, powerdns oder knotdns
  • knot:
    policy:
      - id: "default"
        algorithm: "ecdsap256sha256"
        nsec3: "on"
        nsec3-iterations: "100"
    template:
      - id: "default"
        storage: "/var/lib/knot/zones"
        notify: "slave"
        acl: [ "acl_slave", "deny_all" ]
        dnssec-signing: "on"
        dnssec-policy: "default"
        serial-policy: "dateserial"
    

Debugging

dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com
dnsviz.net
delv (aus BIND9)
delv +vtrace +mtrace m451.de

Fragen?